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INTRODUCTION

Federal courts in the United States have consistently upheld
the constitutional doctrine that "[t]he essential rights of the First
Amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for
order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a
mockery."1
Given the central role of government workers in
maintaining that order, the First Amendment rights of public
employees have been particularly susceptible to restriction. 2 For
example, in 1940, Congress enacted the Hatch Act, which declared
unlawful certain political activities of federal employees. 3 Specifically,
section nine of the Act prohibited officers and employees in the
executive branch from taking "any active part in political management
or in political campaigns." 4 The theory behind restrictions such as
those found in the Hatch Act relied on the state's compelling interest
in encouraging government impartiality and the public perception of
impartiality in government. 5 These restrictions, labeled "public
confidence laws," prohibit not only financial political contributions,
but also contributions of time and energy in an effort to influence an
6
election.
The idea that a politically active government staff threatens
effective administration has filtered down to the state and local level
since the passage of the Hatch Act. Currently, not only are federal
employees subject to public confidence laws, but many state and even
7
local employees have been prohibited from participating in politics.

1.
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947).
2.
See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)
("Congress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be
plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large." (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980))).
3.
Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), extended to state employees by Pub. L. No. 76753, 54 Stat. 767 (1940); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting an employee of the
federal government from using "his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering
with an election or affecting the result of an election").
4.
Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148; Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767, 771; see also
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 78 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 61h (repealed)). The quoted language has been
repealed.
5.
See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
557-66 (1973); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 96-97 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882));
Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 1998).
6.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98.
7.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) (upholding state laws similar to
the federal Hatch Act); Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to a city government's threat to fire a city lawyer if she and
her family did not cease participation in local politics); Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1265 (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma Highway Patrol policy prohibiting highway patrolmen
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While the principles justifying public confidence laws may indeed have
deep judicial and constitutional roots, these laws have expanded at an
alarming rate. The level of restriction they currently impose cannot
be supported by any constitutional theory.
The most disturbing element of modern public confidence laws
is that courts have allowed them to extend so far as to prevent even
spouses and family members of state and local employees from
participating in politics. 8 For example, in English v. Powell, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed a
First Amendment claim by a city employee's wife who argued that her
constitutional rights were violated when the public agency employing
her husband threatened to fire him if she did not cease complaining
about the agency. 9 Similarly, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
recently dismissed claims in which the spouses and children of public
employees contended that public confidence laws had been
unconstitutionally extended to deprive them of their First Amendment
rights to participate in local politics. 10
Rather than expressly holding that public confidence laws can
apply to spouses and children, the courts adopting the English
approach have simply dismissed the suits claiming that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. 1 These courts have held that the claims of the
spouse and children of a public employee are merely derivative of the
employee's claim and that the employee's family does not suffer the
12
injury-in-fact required to bring a primary case before the court.
Because the doctrine allowing restriction of public employees' First

from displaying political yard signs); Reeder v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 543,
547 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding Missouri statute prohibiting members of the Kansas City Police
Department from making any political campaign contributions); Wachsman v. City of Dallas, 704
F.2d 160, 160 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding various provisions of the Dallas city charter which
prevented city employees from making contributions to, or soliciting contributions for, city
council candidates); Otten v. Schicker, 655 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a St. Louis
Police Department local rule preventing officers from running or campaigning for public office);
English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir. 1979) (dismissing the claims of state alcohol board
employees who argued the state could not prevent them from speaking out on a public issue);
Perry v. St. Pierre, 518 F.2d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding a provision in a city charter
which made it unlawful for a city police officer to attempt to influence any voter).
8.
See, e.g., Biggs, 189 F.3d at 991-92; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
9.
592 F.2d at 730.
10. See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998-99; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1265-66.
11. See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998-99; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1265-66.
12. Biggs, 189 F.3d at 998; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279; see also English, 592 F.2d at 730
("It is a novel theory that a wife possesses such a proprietary interest in her husband's position
that a decrease in his salary gives her an actionable claim. Plaintiffs admit that this theory is
without precedent, and we decline to write new law .... "). See generally Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citing the three elements required of a party to have
standing in court).
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Amendment rights prevents the employee from prevailing in court,
the result of these decisions is that no party can challenge public
confidence laws as they are applied to spouses and children. In light
of the importance of the First Amendment to citizens of the United
States, it is unacceptable that many courts have rendered the families
of public employees helpless to challenge such blatant violations of
their constitutional right to free speech.
The evolution of public confidence laws has not gone completely
unchecked.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected the
holdings of English and its progeny, creating a circuit split regarding
the standing of spouses of public employees to bring First Amendment
challenges to public confidence laws. In InternationalAssociation of
Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, the Eighth Circuit held that the wife
of a public employee could maintain a First Amendment challenge to a
city charter provision that prevented her from participating in
politics.13
Despite the Eighth Circuit's holding in International
Association of Firefighters, however, many jurisdictions continue to
14
adopt the approach that spouses of public employees lack standing.
By hiding behind standing rules, these courts are indirectly
promulgating political participation laws that unlawfully apply to the
families of public employees in the same way that they apply to the
employee himself. Instead of continuing this practice, courts must
recognize the judicially created exception to traditional standing rules
that allows for parties in First Amendment cases to challenge a
statute as overly broad on its face even in the absence of the requisite
injury-in-fact to the plaintiff.' 5 The Supreme Court should address
the current split and establish a solution that forces courts to hear the
First Amendment challenges posed by the families of public
employees.
Part II of this Note analyzes the evolution of the judicial
willingness to apply public confidence laws to the spouses and children
of public employees. Part III details the current circuit split, placing
special emphasis on the weaknesses of the English approach to
standing. Parts IV and V propose that the circuit split be resolved by
forcing courts to address the procedural propriety and substantive
merit of facial overbreadth claims in the context of spousal challenges
to public confidence laws. The critical First Amendment issues raised
by the current circuit split highlight the need for a solution that

13.
14.
15.

283 F.3d 969, 976 (8th Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., Biggs, 189 F.3d at 989; English, 592 F.2d at 730.
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
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provides a forum for the First Amendment claims of public employees'
families.

II. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE LAWS APPLIED TO THE SPOUSES AND
CHILDREN OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

A. Pre-HatchAct Decisions
Even prior to the Hatch Act, the United States Supreme Court
upheld provisions that prohibited public officials from engaging in
certain political activities, usually providing financial support to
campaigns. 16 The benchmark case in this area, Ex parte Curtis,
upheld congressional use of power to forbid certain federal employees
from giving money to or receiving money from other government
employees for political purposes. 17 The conclusion that this type of
regulation was constitutional subsequently became so well established
that by 1930, Supreme Court opinions were dismissing First
Amendment challenges to such restrictions with remarkably brief
8
deliberation.'
The reach of restrictions on public employees eventually
extended well beyond financial limits, particularly following the
passage of the Hatch Act in 1940. In United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court reviewed the provisions of the
Hatch Act that prohibited officers and employees in the executive
branch from taking "any active part in political management or in
political campaigns."' 9 The Court found that such restrictions were
"not dissimilar in purpose from the statutes against political
contributions of money" and held that restrictions on expenditures of
energy in politics were also constitutional. 20 The Court relied on the
fact that Congress's great political experience enabled it to reasonably
determine which restrictions were needed to promote efficiency in
government. 21 Despite the fact that the employee in question in
Mitchell was merely a roller in the nation's mint, the Court found that
the restrictions could constitutionally apply to him because Congress
16. See, e.g., Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 371 (1882).
17. Id.; see also United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
18. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98 (noting that by the time of United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S.
396 (1930), "[t]he argument of unconstitutionality because of interference with the political
rights of a citizen ...

was dismissed in a sentence").

19. Id. at 78. The quoted language was part of the original Hatch Act, see Pub. L. No. 76753, 54 Stat. 767, 771 (1940) (now repealed); Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148 (1939).
20. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 98-99.
21.

Id.
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was concerned with the cumulative effect on employee morale and the
need to apply restrictions "without discrimination to all employees
'22
whether industrial or administrative.
Although the majority in Mitchell found the regulations in
question constitutional, Justice Black's dissent suggests that
opponents of such restrictions were growing uneasy about the
potential reach of public confidence laws. 23 Citing the notion that the
First Amendment is the "bulwark of our free political institutions,"
Justice Black acknowledged that "the families of public employees
[are] stripped of their freedom of political action." 24 Justice Black
argued that such laws could be drawn more narrowly to punish only
those who fueled corruption. 25 His dissent demonstrates that the
injustice of extending public confidence laws to the families of
government employees was a concern as early as 1947.26
B.

JudicialResistance After the Hatch Act

Despite the insightful warnings issued by Justice Black in
Mitchell, courts that subsequently addressed the issue of broad public
27
confidence laws continued to uphold their constitutionality.
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, courts consistently held that,
while guaranteed freedoms extend to government employees as they
do other citizens, these freedoms are not absolute when balanced
against the need to protect a democratic society from the supposed evil
of political partisanship by classified public employees. 28 These courts
found that the underlying goals of the restrictions served as sufficient
justification for the burdens on free speech. 29 Specifically, courts held
that government employees' First Amendment rights may be limited
as a means of (1) assuring such employees that their job security does
not depend upon displaying political affiliation or deferring to the
wishes of certain political figures; (2) promoting efficiency among
public employees and the impartial execution of the laws; (3)
22. Id. at 101-02 (quoting section nine of the Hatch Act).
23. Id. at 108 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 108, 110.
25. Id. at 113.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 601 (1973); United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 548 (1973); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 75.
28. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95-96 ("[T]his Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of
freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed
evil of political partisanship by classified employees of government."). See generally Broadrick,
413 U.S. 601; Letter Carriers,413 U.S. 548.
29. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601; Letter Carriers,413 U.S. 548; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 95-96.

2004]

PUBLIC CONFIDENCELAWS GONE A WRY

217

maintaining discipline and preventing corruption in the public service;
and (4) encouragement of impartiality and the public perception of
30
impartiality.
Deference to the congressional goals of public confidence laws
reflected the majority position for decades following the enactment of
the Hatch Act, although some judicial resistance to the broad reach of
such restrictions emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. 31 Strong
dissents were issued in two significant Supreme Court cases
upholding public confidence laws. Additionally, in two other cases, the
Court absolved specific public employees from punishment even
32
though each employee made public statements deemed "political."
The crux of this disagreement was embodied in the majority and
dissenting opinions in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, with the latter arguing
33
for narrower restrictions on government employees' political activity.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court addressed First
Amendment challenges that three employees of the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission brought against a state public confidence
provision.3 4 After the three employees actively participated in the reelection campaign of their superior, the state's Personnel Board
charged them with violating provisions that prohibited employees
from receiving money for political purposes or belonging to political
The Court held that the restrictions at issue were
parties. 35
constitutional as applied to the employees of the Corporation
Commission, reasoning that the Oklahoma law "regulates a
substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state
36
regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass."

30. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 557-66; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 97 (quoting Ex parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)); Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1273-74 (10th Cir.
1998).
31. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 621-33 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 596-600 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (holding that a teacher was unconstitutionally discharged
for sending a letter to a newspaper the criticized school authorities); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S.
375 (1962) (relieving a sheriff from a contempt conviction for making a public statement in
connection with a current political controversy).
32. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573 (holding that a teacher was unconstitutionally discharged for
sending a letter to a newspaper the criticized school authorities); Wood, 370 U.S. at 375
(relieving a sheriff from a contempt conviction for making a public statement in connection with
a current political controversy).
33. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601.
34. Id. at 602.
35. Id. at 601, 605-06.
36. Id. at 616.

218

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

Justice Douglas voiced a strong dissent; as did Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall.3 7 Douglas's
dissent noted that public employees, both federal and state, number
over thirteen million and cover an extremely broad range of
occupations. 38 He argued that prohibiting the political activity of
these individuals was irrational not only because it eliminated the
basic freedoms of such a large class, but also because it created
"faceless, nameless bureaucrats who are inert in their localities and
submissive to some master's voice." 39 This argument constituted a
direct attack on the majority's proposition that government functioned
better when its employees avoided political action. Douglas' dissent
further posited that sweeping restrictive legislation was not the
answer to gaining public confidence in government. 40
C.

StandingAfter the Broadrick Decision

Unlike prior cases involving public confidence laws, the
Broadrick case presented a novel twist that forced the Court to
address the issue of standing. In addition to asserting that reelection
activities could not be regulated, the Broadrick claimants maintained
that the statute should be struck down as unconstitutionally
overbroad on its face because it purported to regulate protected as well
as unprotected conduct. 4 1 However, because the Broadrick claimants
had not in fact engaged in the allegedly protected conduct, which
included the displaying of political buttons and bumper stickers, the
42
Court dismissed these overbreadth claims on standing grounds.
In dismissing the overbreadth claims, the Broadrick majority
relied upon traditional rules of constitutional adjudication. These
rules mandate that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally
be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in
other situations not before the Court."43 Nevertheless, the Court

37. Id. at 618-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 621-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 620 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ('These people are scrubwomen, janitors, typists, file
clerks, chauffeurs, messengers, nurses, orderlies, policemen and policewomen, night watchmen,
telephone and elevator operators, as well as those doing some kind of administrative, executive,
or judicial work.").
39. Id. at 621.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 610.
42. Id.
43. Id. The Court also cited the doctrine that "constitutional rights are personal and may
not be asserted vicariously." Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961)).
Furthermore, the Court alluded to the proposition that courts in the United States are not
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conceded that exceptions to this rule exist. These exceptions are
particularly prevalent in the area of the First Amendment, where
traditional standing rules permit 'attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
the requisite narrow specificity."' 44 Such "facial overbreadth" claims
have been allowed in light of the conclusion that the possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be muted and their
grievances left unheard because of the inhibitory effects of overly
45
broad statutes.
Statutes found to be overly broad cannot be enforced unless
and until a limiting provision or partial invalidation narrows the
46
statute to remove the threat to constitutionally protected rights.
Because such a result is, as the Broadrick Court noted, "strong
medicine" that is rarely employed, the majority promulgated a strict
standard for when a statute can be found overly broad.47 The Court
required that the overbreadth of the statute "must not only be real,
but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep." 48 As a result, the Broadrick Court held that the
statute could not be discarded altogether simply because "some
persons' arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or
chilled . . . ."49 In short, the majority dismissed the facial overbreadth
claim because the Oklahoma statute was not substantially overbroad
enough to outweigh the traditional standing rules requiring the party
50
bringing the action to be actually affected by a statutory provision.

"roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws," and
therefore require a particular case of rights infringement in order to act. Id. at 610-11 (citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971)).
44. Id. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). This exception
addresses the "chilling effect" that some statutes may have on First Amendment rights, whereby
a statute's very existence "may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." Id.
45. Id. Additional examples of facial overbreadth cases involving statutes that sought to
regulate speech include Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15
(1971); and Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Additional examples of facial overbreadth
cases involving statutes that sought to regulate expressive conduct include Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967); and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
46. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 615.
49. Id. at 618.
50. Id. at 615-17.
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Broadrick directly criticized the
majority's explanation of the facial overbreadth doctrine. 51 Citing the
majority's proposition that traditional standing rules sometimes
permit attacks on overly broad statutes even when a person's rights
are not directly regulated, the dissent contended that the case at hand
warranted such an attack. 52 Justice Brennan rejected the majority's
reliance on standing in light of the "supremely precious" position of
the First Amendment in the United States and the fact that "[t]he
threat of sanctions [on political expression] may deter [its] exercise
53
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions."
III. BROADRICK SETS THE STAGE FOR A MODERN CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although the Broadrick Court dismissed the plaintiffs'
challenges to the Oklahoma statute on the grounds that the facts did
not warrant the application of the facial overbreadth doctrine, the case
nonetheless partially validated the plaintiffs' claim. That the opinion
went to great lengths in rejecting the doctrine demonstrated the
Court's realization that public confidence laws often come dangerously
close to violating the Constitution. 54 Furthermore, the fact that the
case sparked such a strong and emotionally charged dissent supported
by three Justices (as well as Justice Douglas's separate dissent)
indicated that the winds of change were blowing forcefully regarding
judicial acceptance of the constitutionality of public confidence laws. 55
Despite the outcome of the Broadrick case, the debate over
standing challenges in public confidence laws was just beginning, and
the issue would be brought before the courts several times in the
decades that followed. These later cases would spark an entirely new
discourse on the proper scope of public confidence laws by questioning
the application of such laws to the families of public employees.
A. English v. Powell
Just six years after the Supreme Court battled over standing
issues and the facial overbreadth doctrine in Broadrick, a similar
51. Id. at 621-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 629 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) and Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 618 ("Appellants further point to the Board's interpretive rules purporting to
restrict such allegedly protected activities as the wearing of political buttons or the use of
bumper stickers. It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that § 818 may be
susceptible of some other improper applications.").
55. Id. at 621-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 618-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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constitutional question emerged in the Fourth Circuit. In English v.
Powell, employees of a county Alcoholic Beverage Board brought an
action claiming the Board had violated their First Amendment
rights. 56 Unlike Broadrick, the claim in English did not challenge a
particular statute. Instead, it asserted an unconstitutional restriction
stemming from the Board's alleged prohibition of vocal employee
criticism and membership in employee associations. 57 Specifically, the
employees claimed that they were told they would be fired unless they
ceased speaking out against Board management and terminated their
memberships in the Alcohol Board Employee Association. 58 The
Fourth Circuit dismissed the employees' claims, however, holding that
the employees had not proven that the Board had infringed upon their
59
First Amendment rights.
While the Court had little trouble dismissing the claims of the
employees, it was also forced to address a more complicated claim.
Vera Shands, the wife of a Board employee, asserted that the Board
had infringed her First Amendment rights, thereby raising a novel
argument that would launch an entirely new line of cases involving
60
First Amendment rights.
Ms. Shands based this argument on Bigelow v. Virginia, a
Supreme Court case addressing the statutory overbreadth issues
raised in Broadrick.61 The Bigelow Court held that a party has
standing to challenge a statute on the grounds that it is too broad on
its face to be constitutional provided that the challenging party has
asserted more than "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill"' and has
claimed a specific, objective, present harm or a threat of specific future
harm. 62 Maintaining that the effect of the Board's actions was
comparable to the effect of an overbroad restrictive statute, Ms.
Shands argued for standing under the Bigelow standard. 63 She
contended not only that the threats made to her husband subjectively
chilled her First Amendment rights, but also that her husband's
demotion objectively harmed her because she was forced to take a job
to supplement the family income. 64 The Fourth Circuit, however,
found these claims too indirect and too speculative to support Ms.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 729-30 (4th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 731.
Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 732, 734.
Id. at 730.
Id.; see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 816-17.
English, 592 F.2d at 730.
Id.
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Shands' standing as a plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the propriety
of her husband's demotion.6 5 The court supported its conclusion by
stating that "[iut is a novel theory that a wife possesses such a
proprietary interest in her husband's position that a decrease in his
66
salary gives her an actionable claim."
B.

Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety

After the Fourth Circuit rejected Ms. Shands' novel standing
arguments in the English case, the issue did not arise again to a
significant degree for nearly two decades.
In Horstkoetter v.
Department of Public Safety, however, a claim similar to that of Ms.
Shands was brought before the Tenth Circuit. 67 Although the court
ultimately sustained the English holding, the court was noticeably
more receptive to the First Amendment challenge posed. While the
Fourth Circuit had been reluctant to write new law on the issue of
spousal standing in 1979,68 the Horstkoetter court at least recognized
the problems posed by extending public confidence provisions to the
families of public employees. 69 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
70
spousal claim on standing grounds.
In Horstkoetter, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol had ordered
two highway patrol troopers to remove political signs from their
residences pursuant to a departmental public confidence policy
prohibiting the troopers from wearing partisan political buttons or
displaying signs at their homes. 71 Although the two troopers initially
refused, claiming that the signs belonged to their wives, the Highway
Patrol Supervisors responded that it did not matter to whom the signs
belonged and that the officers could be suspended or even fired if the
signs were not taken down. 72 After the troopers relayed the threat to
their wives, the signs were removed. 73
After the signs were removed, Paula Horstkoetter, the wife of
one of the troopers, sent a letter to the head of Oklahoma's
Department of Public Safety expressing her dissatisfaction with the

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 159 F.3d 1265, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
68. English, 592 F.2d at 730.
69. Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279-80. The court noted that the statute at issue did not
authorize direct punishment of spouses. Id. at 1279.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1269.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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resolution of the situation.7 4 The Department stated that it supported
the resolution of the matter, citing the Department policy and alluding
to an Oklahoma statute that made it a crime for members of the
Highway Patrol to take part in, or make any contribution to, any
The Horstkoetters and the Deans,
campaign for public office.75
another family ordered to remove political signs, then filed suit,
claiming the policy was unconstitutional both on its face and as
applied to them. 76 Although both families joined together to make a
single challenge to the statute, the claims of the troopers themselves
were quite different than the claims of their wives, given that the
statute technically applied only to the troopers themselves. This led
and Ms. Dean
the court to address the claims of Ms. Horstkoetter
77
husbands.
their
of
claims
separately from the
The analysis of the wives' claims hinged upon basic standing
rules stating that Article III of the Constitution requires that federal

74. Id.
75. Id. at 1269-70.
76. Id. at 1270.
77. See id. at 1271-80. Although not specifically relevant to this Note, the court's resolution
of the troopers' claims warrants a comment, as it raised an interesting issue regarding the
traditional challenges to public confidence laws. Based on a critical distinction between property
solely owned by the trooper and property that was jointly owned, the Tenth Circuit held that if a
trooper has sole ownership of the property upon which the sign was placed, he has the lawful
right to remove the sign, and his refusal to do so would violate the state's public confidence
policy. Id. at 1275. However, if another party, such as his spouse, had an ownership interest in
the residential property, the trooper would not have the lawful right to remove the sign, and
could not, therefore, be in violation of the policy by refusing to do so. Id. at 1275-76. In short,
the court held that the state could not "require a trooper to do what property law does not allow
him to do." Id. at 1276. Because the Horstkoetters owned their residence together as joint
tenants, the court held that the Oklahoma Highway Patrol could not constitutionally extend its
policy so far as to require Mr. Horstkoetter to remove his wife's signs. Id. Nonetheless, his
claims for prospective relief were dismissed because his retirement before the trial had rendered
the issue moot. Id. at 1277. The court also dismissed Mr. Horstkoetter's claims for damages
because they were barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. Mootness rules are
explained and elaborated upon in the following cases: Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) ("The requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).");
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
claims for prospective relief will be mooted if an event occurs while a case is pending that heals
the injury); McClendon v.City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996) ("When a party
seeks only equitable relief.., past exposure to alleged illegal conduct does not establish present
live controversy if unaccompanied by any continuing present effects."). Qualified immunity is
explained in Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity is a
doctrine which shields government officials performing discretionary functions from individual
civil liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known").
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79
controversy requirement has three crucial elements.
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The case or

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" that is "concrete" rather than
"conjectural or hypothetical." Second, the plaintiff must show that there is a "causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." Finally, the plaintiff
must show that it is "likely" and not merely "speculative" that the injury complained of
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."0

Impliedly conceding that the claims of Ms. Horstkoetter and
Ms. Dean would satisfy the second and third requirements for
standing if the first requirement were met, the Oklahoma Highway
81
Patrol contended only that the wives had suffered no injury-in-fact.
The wives claimed that they were injured by having to remove signs
82
from their private residences in order to spare their husbands' jobs.
Addressing the injury-in-fact issue, the court held that because Ms.
Horstkoetter and Ms. Dean were never in danger of being directly
punished under the Department's public confidence policy, they had
standing only to raise the same claims as their husbands.8 3 Moreover,
despite the State's suggestion to Ms. Horstkoetter that her property
was subject to the Department's policy just as her husband's property
was, the court found that "the only penalties that can be inflicted upon
anyone for violations ... [are] employment sanctions or criminal
penalties against the troopers themselves. '8 4 The State therefore
could not have fined the wives, taken disciplinary action against them,
85
or physically removed the signs from their respective residences.
Because there was no way that the wives could have been directly

78. Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
79. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279.
80. Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279 (citation omitted).
81. See id. This aspect of the Highway Patrol's argument is important because as a result,
the court's opinion focused only on the injury-in-fact requirement. Similarly, each of the
subsequent public confidence cases cited in this note also focuses squarely on the first
requirement, failing to discuss the remaining two. See Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002); Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 998
(9th Cir. 1999). While this author cannot speak for the courts deciding these cases, it is likely
that, like the Highway Patrol in Horstkoetter, the parties impliedly conceded that if there were
indeed an injury-in-fact, the second and third requirements would also be satisfied. In terms of
the second requirement, there is at the very least a causal connection between the restriction of
First Amendment rights and the statute that imposed those restrictions. In terms of the third
requirement, it is more than likely that striking down the restrictive statute at issue would
eliminate the very First Amendment restriction provoking complaint.
82. Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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injured by any application of the policy, the court found that they did
86
not have standing to mount a separate First Amendment challenge.
The Horstkoetter court's acknowledgement that the state could
not directly punish Ms. Horstkoetter or Ms. Dean under the statute
revealed a flaw in its conclusion that public confidence laws could be
constitutionally applied to the spouses of public employees.8 7 If the
statute could not authorize punishment of the wives, how could it still
prevent them from participating in the prohibited acts, which it
effectively did?
Furthermore, the court's strict adherence to
traditional rules exposed another weakness in its opinion. The court's
crucial assumption that the wives' claims were speculative or
88
incidental would seem to warrant some further explanation.
However, the Horstkoettercourt failed to provide such an explanation.
In so doing, the court made an error similar to that of its counterpart
in English, ignoring the judicially accepted exception to standing rules
that allows parties to challenge a First Amendment restriction as
89
unconstitutionally broad on its face.
In light of these flaws in the Horstkoetter opinion, the case
provided reason for guarded optimism on the part of spouses seeking
to challenge public confidence laws. 90 Although the outcome was not
necessarily favorable to Ms. Dean and Ms. Horstkoetter, it indicated
that courts were perhaps no longer dismissing spousal challenges
based on the cursory examination of traditional standing rules
demonstrated in English. Thus, Horstkoetter in a sense opened the
door for spouses in similar situations to bring First Amendment
claims in the hope of exploiting the opinion's weaknesses and forcing
courts to cease hiding behind standing rules.

86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. It is notable that based upon the court's analysis of property law, the Horstkoetter case
provided further reason for guarded optimism in certain situations not specifically at issue in
this Note, which involve joint ownership of property between husband and wife. See supra note
77. In light of the court's distinction regarding the joint ownership of property, the Horstkoetter
case suggested that if Mr. Horstkoetter's retirement had not rendered the case moot, he and his
wife would likely have succeeded in their claims. Thus, Horstkoetter opened the door for future
claims by spouses of public employees who had a property interest in their residences and had
been prohibited from erecting political signs there.
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C. Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger
Although the Horstkoetter case appeared to create a small
window of opportunity for spousal challenges to public confidence
laws, the Ninth Circuit closed this window with its opinion in Biggs v.
Best, Best & Krieger.9 1 Julie Biggs was an associate in a private law
firm that performed work for the city of Redlands, California. 92 In
October of 1991, a partner in the firm allegedly told Ms. Biggs that
she should limit her husband's involvement in Redlands politics
because it could jeopardize the firm's contract with the city. 93 Mr.
Biggs had sent a letter to a local newspaper that endorsed a particular
candidate for Redlands City Council, and he had allegedly distributed
petitions to recall the city's mayor. 94 Ms. Biggs had allegedly
supported her husband's activity as had the Biggs's daughter. 95 As
these activities continued, Julie Biggs's position with the firm
deteriorated and she was told she would no longer make partner. 96
The Biggs then filed suit against the City of Redlands and two city
councilmen who had allegedly threatened to terminate the city's
relationship with the firm if Ms. Biggs and her family continued their
involvement in local politics. 97 One week after these suits were filed,
Ms. Biggs's firm terminated her "because of the ethical conflicts
created by her suit and the firm's duties to its client, [the City of]
98
Redlands."
The Biggs's claim alleged, inter alia, that the council
defendants had violated the family's First Amendment rights by
threatening to fire Ms. Biggs's firm for her family's political
activities. 99 In resolving the dispute, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
on Branti v. Finkel and Elrod v. Burns.1 00 In both cases, the Supreme
Court held that a government employee generally cannot be
91. 189 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 1999).
92. Id. at 991.
93. Id. at 992.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that any person
may bring a claim against a government official who acts under color of state law to deprive that
person of constitutional rights. Because the suit was brought against two public officials, the
court began its analysis by examining the qualified immunity doctrine, which shields such
officials from liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Biggs, 189 F.3d at 993-94..
100. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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terminated because of his political associations unless the employee
has a policy-making or confidential position in which political
considerations are requirements for effective job performance. 10 1 The
Biggs court came to "the inevitable conclusion that Julie Biggs did in
fact occupy a policymaking position with respect to the City of
Redlands.' 10 2 As a result, the court held that the policy-making
nature of Ms. Biggs's position precluded her First Amendment
3
claim.10
Although the court dismissed Julie Biggs's claim, her husband
and daughter argued that their actions were separate from those of
Ms. Biggs.10 4 However, citing Horstkoetter and English, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the claims of Ms. Biggs's family were merely
derivative of Ms. Biggs's claim. 0 5 Therefore, as in Horstkoetter, the
court found that the family's claims were subject to the same
standards as Julie Biggs's claims. 0 6 Because the council defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity from Julie Biggs's claims, they
were also entitled to qualified immunity from the claims of her
107
family.
While the weaknesses of the Horstkoetter opinion seemingly
opened the door for spouses to successfully challenge public confidence
laws, the Biggs case suggested that the issue was a lost cause. First,
by failing to invoke Horstkoetter's conclusion that public confidence
statutes could not authorize punishment of spouses, the Ninth Circuit
impliedly denied such a challenge. 0 8 Moreover, like the Horstkoetter
court, the Biggs court failed to convincingly explain why the claims of
Despite
Ms. Biggs's husband and daughter were derivative. 0 9
acknowledging that the loss of Ms. Biggs's salary was indeed an injury
to her husband and daughter and that the loss was "not
insubstantial," the court nevertheless concluded that the injury did
101. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372-73.
102. Biggs, 189 F.3d at 995 (citing Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890-91 (2d
Cir. 1997) and Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 1990)). Citing the
tests established in prior cases with similar facts, the Biggs court found that Julie Biggs occupied
a policy-making position because she participated in Redlands City Council meetings and
performed other activities for the city, which required her to apply a personal analysis to valueladen, politically controversial matters. See id. at 995-96 (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517,
520, 522 (3d Cir. 1981) and Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 830 (7th Cir. 1977)).
103. Id. at 997.
104. Id. at 998.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 998-99 ("[This type of injury is sufficiently substantial to permit Jerry and
Holly Biggs to raise only the same claims as Julie Biggs.").
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not warrant independent standing. 110 Most importantly, the court's
reliance on English and Horstkoetter rendered it unable to recognize
that a facial overbreadth challenge was also available to the Biggs.
Because such a challenge would not have required an injury-in-fact,
the Biggs may have succeeded with it.
However, by again
characterizing spousal challenges to public confidence laws as mere
derivatives, the Biggs decision ignored this option and dealt a major
blow to spouses seeking to bring similar First Amendment claims.
D.

International Association of Firefighters v. City of Ferguson

Despite the apparent judicial antipathy toward utilizing
standing rules to allow spousal challenges to public confidence laws, a
recent Eighth Circuit decision did just that."'
In International
Association of Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, the court expressly
rejected the approaches taken in English, Horstkoetter, and Biggs,
holding that a spouse of a public employee had independent standing
to challenge a particular public confidence law.11 2 The case centered
on a provision in the charter of the city of Ferguson, Missouri, which
stated that no person holding an administrative position with the city
could "engage, directly or indirectly, in sponsoring, electioneering or
contributing money or other things of value for any person who is a
candidate for mayor or council."'1 3 Lloyd Thompson, a local firefighter
and city employee, and his wife brought suit against the city, claiming
the charter provision violated their First Amendment rights.11 4 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on all
claims brought by the Thompsons.'1 5 The Eighth Circuit abruptly
affirmed the district court's decision with respect to Mr. Thompson's
claim, but determined that the crucial issue on appeal centered upon
the applicability of the charter provision to Mr. Thompson's wife,
16
Alma Mendez-Thompson.1

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 998.
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 971.

114. Id.

115. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the city defendants on the grounds
that the provision was 'necessary to protect against the erosion of public confidence in the
impartiality of the provision of Government services, in preserving the fairness of City elections,
and in preserving the efficiency of the operations of the City."' Id. at 972 (quoting Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:00CV00241, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *62 (E.D.
Mo. April 17, 2001)).
116. Id. at 971.
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Before Ms. Mendez-Thompson moved to Missouri, she had
participated in politics in New York, specifically in a campaign for a
Ms. Mendez-Thompson had hoped to
local councilwoman. 117
participate in similar activities in Ferguson politics. 1 18 However, after
learning of the city charter's public confidence provision, Ms, MendezThompson feared that her political participation might jeopardize her
husband's position. 11 9 She then sent a letter to the city inquiring if
her husband would be disciplined if she ran for office, electioneered, or
contributed money to a candidate for local office.1 20 Although the city
never answered her letter, Ms. Mendez-Thompson nonetheless felt
afraid to participate in politics. 121 She therefore brought her own
challenge to the charter provision, asserting that the city threatened
to interpret it in such a way as to injure her First Amendment
rights. 122
Although the district court concluded that Ms. MendezThompson lacked standing to challenge the provision because she was
not an employee of the city, this finding was reversed on appeal. The
Eighth Circuit found that because the city "seemed to claim" that it
could discipline her husband on account of her activities, Ms. MendezThompson's challenge in fact asserted her own rights.1 23 The court
held that Ms. Mendez-Thompson had "her own rights to participate in
political activities, and if her husband were disciplined or lost his job,
the economic adverse effect on her would be clear, especially, perhaps,
in view of the fact that they ha[d] a joint bank account."' 24 So, Ms.
Mendez-Thompson had suffered an injury-in-fact.
In support of its decision, the Eighth Circuit cited the general
rules of standing in federal courts, noting that the standing doctrine
embraces prudential as well as constitutional concerns.1 25 First, the
court addressed the prudential concern that the complaint must fall

117. Id. at 972.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Id. Ms. Mendez-Thompson's argument was bolstered by the fact that the City mayor
gave a deposition under oath, stating that if an employee's spouse or children placed a yard sign
in front of their home, the employee would be considered to be "indirectly" engaging in political
Similarly, the mayor maintained that a political
activity, in violation of the charter. Id.
contribution made from a couple's joint bank account would presumably be subject to the same
logic. Id.
123. Id. at 973.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982)).
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within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. 126 The court
held that Ms. Mendez-Thompson's complaint clearly fell within this
zone because her right to political activity was "at the very heart of
the interests protected by the First Amendment." 127 Next, the court
recognized the concern that a plaintiff ordinarily "must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties. ' 128 Because Ms. MendezThompson had interests in her own political activity, as well as in her
personal and economic status, the court found that she was not merely
resting her claim on the rights of her husband. 29 Finally, the court
addressed the standing concern that a suit "must present more than
'abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to
generalized grievances' that are most appropriately addressed by the
legislature. 3 0° The court held that Ms. Mendez-Thompson had also
cleared this hurdle because, although public issues were at stake, her
13
particular constitutional rights had been restricted as well. '
Drawing on its conclusion that Ms. Mendez-Thompson's First
Amendment rights had been restricted, the Eighth Circuit expressed
its disagreement with opinions such as English, Horstkoetter, and
Biggs. 32 The court concluded that these decisions were erroneous
because the spousal injury in question in all cases, while indirect, was
"nonetheless real and tangible."'133 While Ms. Mendez-Thompson may
not have had a proprietary interest in her husband's job, the court
held that she may have had "a legal interest in the income that
derives from that job."'1 4 The loss of his job could therefore have had a
"catastrophic" effect on Ms. Mendez-Thompson's life and economic
status, an injury sufficient for the court to grant her independent
35
standing.
Although the ultimate result of International Association of
Firefighters was favorable to spouses seeking to challenge public
confidence laws, the court, like those in the English line of cases, still
did not address the possibility of a facial overbreadth claim. In
addressing the city's contention that the uncertainty of injury to Ms.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
at 973-74.
at 974 (quoting Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 475).
at 974-75.
at 975.
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Mendez-Thompson deprived her of standing, the court began down the
road of a facial overbreadth inquiry, concluding that "certainty of
injury is not necessary, at least in the First Amendment context."'136
The court also noted that Ms. Mendez-Thompson should not be
required to undertake the prohibited activity and risk the
consequences in order to test the validity of the charter provision, but
it did so without specific reference to Broadrick or any other case
addressing the facial overbreadth exception. 137 While the court's
decision in favor of Ms. Mendez-Thompson rendered an overbreadth
inquiry unnecessary, such an inquiry would have provided even
stronger support for the decision.

IV. A JUDICIALLY SOUND SOLUTION TO PREVENT THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE LAWS

The conflicting holdings of the Fourth, Tenth, Ninth, and
Eighth Circuits regarding the standing qualifications of spouses
challenging public confidence laws highlight the need for the Supreme
Court to resolve this issue, particularly if the Court is to adhere to the
notion that the First Amendment is the "bulwark of our free political
institutions."'' 3 8
The result of the International Association of
Firefighterscase suggests that courts are beginning to recognize that
English and its progeny have failed by utilizing the standing doctrine
to dismiss spousal challenges to public confidence laws.
The
shortcoming of InternationalAssociation of Firefighters, however, is
that the Eighth Circuit used the same standing analysis as the
English line of cases, simply reaching a different, defensible, yet not
sufficiently differentiated conclusion.139 While that conclusion may be
correct, the Eighth Circuit in effect simply disagreed with the other
circuits without providing sufficient analysis of why its decision was
40
superior.1
What the Eighth Circuit failed to recognize was that its
decision had a deeper constitutional base than the opinions in English,
Horstkoette,r and Biggs. The court could have avoided a simple
disagreement with the other circuits and promulgated a more legally
sound opinion by incorporating key elements from prior Supreme
Court opinions. First, the court did not sufficiently address the
judicial requirement, introduced in Mitchell and strengthened in
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947).
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,283 F.3d at 974-75.
See id. at 975.
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Broadrick, that statutes limiting First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn. 14 1 More importantly, the Eighth Circuit seemingly
overlooked the Broadrick Court's treatment of the key exception to
traditional standing laws that allows for statutory facial overbreadth
142
challenges.
The Eighth Circuit was not alone in overlooking these themes;
the English, Horstkoetter and Biggs opinions also neglected to include
them in their analyses.1 43 Nonetheless, if the Eighth Circuit had
looked outside the box rather than allowing the English line of cases
to dictate the rules of the debate, its ultimate conclusion could have
been compelling enough for adoption by the Supreme Court. By
deciding the case strictly on traditional standing grounds rather than
challenging the English, Horstkoetter, and Biggs courts to recognize
the facial overbreadth exception, the Eighth Circuit missed an
opportunity to force the English supporters to reevaluate their
position from a new perspective. The International Association of
Firefightersopinion, therefore, is subject to simple disagreement from
English supporters as to the proper definition of injury-in-fact.
However, simply incorporating the aforementioned themes from
Broadrick and Mitchell into the International Association of
Firefightersholding would create an effective, judicially sound solution
to the circuit split that could withstand scrutiny from supporters of
English and its progeny.
A. Facial Overbreadth Challenges Can Be Brought by Persons Not
Directly Injured by The Legislation
Although the majority opinion in Broadrick v. Oklahoma
ultimately upheld the public confidence statute at issue, an analysis of
the case reveals a crucial exception to standing rules that the opinions
comprising the current circuit split fail to address. 144 As evidenced by
cases such as Horstkoetter and Biggs, traditional standing rules hold
that courts will not hear a statutory challenge unless the statute in
1 45
question directly applies to the person bringing the challenge.
However, in the First Amendment arena, the Supreme Court has
recognized an exception to this rule that in certain circumstances
141. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 105 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
142. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
143. See Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 1999); Horstkoetter v. Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998); English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1979).
144. 413 U.S. at 611-12.
145. See Biggs, 189 F.3d at 997-99; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1278-80.
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allows claimants to attack a statute as invalid and overbroad on its
face.1 46 The Broadrick Court explained:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that
statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must
be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular
mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society .... Litigants,
therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute [on its face] not because their own rights
of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that
the statute's very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from
147
constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Therefore, the standing requirement that a litigant suffer a
direct injury-in-fact is relaxed in certain situations involving the
constitutionality of statutes restricting expression under the First
Amendment.
Although the Broadrick Court recognized this exception, it
concluded that the exception was only to be applied in rare situations
148
when the overbreadth of the statute was "real" and "substantial."
The court concluded that, while public confidence laws "may deter
speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that
effect... cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its
face .... *"149 Following this reasoning, the Court refused to invalidate
the statute in question because its alleged overbreadth was not
sufficiently real or substantial. 150 The majority also noted that it is a
"matter of no little difficulty" to determine when a statute should be
found invalid on its face and that the issue must be addressed on a
5
case by case basis.' '
The Supreme Court's analysis in Broadrick reveals one of the
major flaws of the modern circuit court opinions addressing spousal
challenges to public confidence laws.
Put simply, the English,
Horstkoetter, Biggs and even InternationalAssociation of Firefighters
courts seem to have forgotten about the facial overbreadth exception
to traditional standing rules upon which the Broadrick opinion
focused. None of the four cases that comprise the current circuit split
entertained the notion of a facial overbreadth challenge. Instead, the
cases hinge upon what is and what is not an injury-in-fact, deciding if
spousal claims are mere "derivatives" of the claims brought by the
52
actual employees.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 615.
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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The fact that the current circuit split involves First
Amendment restrictions that were originally intended to maintain
confidence in public employees but have now expanded to restrict even
the families of those employees suggests that these cases present
exactly the situations that the Broadrick Court envisioned when
formulating the facial overbreadth exception. 153 However, while the
Broadrick Court advocated a case-by-case approach to the overbreadth
issue, the four modern public confidence laws cases have effectively
precluded such an analysis by avoiding facial overbreadth challenges
154
altogether.
While it must be noted that the failure of modern courts to
entertain facial overbreadth claims could be the result of insufficient
pleadings by the plaintiffs in each case, for the benefit of future
litigants courts should at least note the availability of such claims
when addressing injury-in-fact challenges. Each of the four modern
cases, however, relied solely upon the form of the challenges brought
before them.1 55 In order to prevent the alarming First Amendment
violations spawned by such a narrow approach, courts must
acknowledge that facial overbreadth claims are indeed a legitimate
and proper procedural avenue for spouses attempting to protect their
constitutional rights regardless of whether the substantive merits of
the case ultimately warrant redress.
B.

Justice Black's Warning

Not only are facial overbreadth challenges a proper procedural
avenue for spouses challenging public confidence laws, they also have
considerable substantive merit in the spousal context. Although the
majority in the Mitchell case ultimately rejected a challenge to a
public confidence statute, Justice Black's dissenting opinion
recognized that the scope of public confidence laws was expanding to
an alarming and unconstitutional degree. 15 6 Black chastised the
majority for relying too heavily on precedent such as Ex parte Curtis
in order to extend the reach of public confidence laws far beyond the
57
permissible limits of the Constitution.
153. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
154. See id.; supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
156. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 105-07 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("No one of all these millions of citizens [i.e., government employees] can... [have
an] effective part in campaigns that may bring about changes in their lives, their fortunes, and
their happiness.").
157. Id. at 112 ("[The Curtis decision seems implicitly to have rested on the assumption that
many political activities of government employees, beyond merely voting and speaking secretly,
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Whereas Ex parte Curtis had only validated public confidence
laws to the extent that they limited employees' rights to collect money
for politics, the Mitchell majority upheld the constitutionality of a
statute that banned nearly all political activity other than the right to
vote. 158 Warning against such expansion, Justice Black observed that
far-reaching legislation was being upheld based on unnecessarily
broad, if not altogether erroneous, readings of precedent. 159 In short,
the judicial interpretation of public confidence laws no longer reflected
the legislative goal of merely insulating public employees from
160
political influence.
Responding to the perceived danger of unconstitutionally broad
prohibitions, Justice Black argued that public confidence in
government could be effectively maintained through less restrictive
means. 16 1 Black advocated the penalizing of corrupt individuals
rather than the use of broad, prospective legislation. 162 Conceding
that some persons in powerful positions could perhaps improperly
influence politics, his dissent maintained that laws should punish only
those public officials who engage in corrupt practices rather than
precluding a large number of people, most of whom have the best of
intentions, from exercising their rights.' 63
Recognizing the
constitutional impropriety of such sweeping prohibitions, he concluded
that "punish[ing] millions of employees ... in order to remove
temptation from a proportionately small number of [corrupt] public
64
officials" seemed an unnecessarily extreme measure.
The Broadrick Court echoed Justice Black's fears when it held
that a statute must be narrowly drawn to fit a legislative goal when it
restricts First Amendment rights.' 6 5 Nonetheless, the Broadrick
majority concluded that the statute at issue in the case was
sufficiently narrow.' 66 Justice Brennan's dissent, however, took up
where Justice Black's dissent in Mitchell left off, urging the court to

would not, and could not under the Constitution, be impaired by the legislation there at issue."
(citing Exparte Curtis, 106 U.S. 373, 375 (1882))).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 108.
160. Id. at 113 ('Therefore, it is possible that other groups may later be compelled to sacrifice
their right to participate in political activities for the protection of the purity of the Government
of which they are a part.").
161. Id. at 114.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); see also Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 114
(Black, J., dissenting).
166. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16.

236

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

take a harder look at broad legislation that limited First Amendment
rights. 16 7 Brennan pointed to prior cases in which the court had
explicitly held that a statute must be held invalid on its face when it
broadly authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected
conduct. 168 Justice Brennan concluded that in failing to properly
distinguish these prior cases, the Broadrick majority implicitly
overruled its prior holding. 169
By failing to reach the merits of facial overbreadth claims,
modern courts have fallen into the very trap that the dissents in
Mitchell and Broadrick warned against. 170 The courts comprising the
current split have seemingly overread precedent to imply that public
confidence laws are narrow enough to avoid facial overbreadth
challenges. 171 As a result, these courts have improperly focused their
inquiries on whether or not the statutes inflict a direct harm upon
spouses that is sufficient to warrant independent standing. 172 In
short, the strict reliance of these courts on the substance of traditional
injury-in-fact standing has prevented them from addressing the
substantive merits of the facial overbreadth challenges.
If modern courts had engaged in analysis of the merits of facial
overbreadth challenges, they likely would have determined that the
application of public confidence statutes to spouses renders them
facially overbroad. Given that the Mitchell and Broadrick cases
involved challenges to restrictive statutes by public employees
themselves, the concerns expressed by Justices Black and Brennan
carry even greater significance when such laws are applied to the
spouses of those public officials. 173 Because the legislative goal of
public confidence laws is to immunize government employees from
political influence, it is difficult to imagine that such statutes are
narrowly drawn when their prohibitions extend to individuals who do
not work for the government. If it is at least questionable that public
confidence laws can prevent all government employees from engaging
in nearly all political activity, it follows that the laws lose their
legitimacy altogether when they apply to the families of those
employees.

167. Id. at 622 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 632 (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
169. Id.

170. Id. at 622; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
171. See supranotes 11-12 and accompanying text.
172. See supranotes 11-12 and accompanying text.
173. See generally Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 621-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 330 U.S.
at 105-15 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Again, it must be noted that the failure of the courts to address
the substance of facial overbreadth challenges to public confidence
laws could stem from poor pleading by the plaintiffs. However, in
light of the importance of First Amendment rights in American
democracy, courts should not look to the form or procedure of these
spousal challenges as an excuse to dismiss them. A workable solution
to the modern circuit split must not only allow courts to address facial
overbreadth claims as a procedural matter; it must also force courts to
recognize the substantive validity of such claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

Public confidence laws, when properly constructed, can serve a
legitimate social function. There is great merit in the argument that
the political process functions more efficiently, and the public is more
confident in that process, when government employees are insulated
from political pressures. 17 4 Therefore, courts evaluating narrow
restrictions on public employees have generally been correct in
175
upholding them as a means to promote a legitimate legislative goal.
This legitimate goal cannot be justified, however, once those laws
extend to the spouses of public employees. Given that these spouses
do not work for the government, they have, at most, an attenuated
connection to the political systems in which the other spouse is
employed. Nonetheless, courts have often applied public confidence
laws to the families of public employees, thereby allowing a severe
1 76
restriction on their First Amendment rights.
Spouses of public employees seeking to challenge the extension
of public confidence laws have generally met staunch opposition from
courts. Frequently, courts hearing spouses' claims have utilized
traditional standing doctrine to dispose of the claims.1 77 In light of the
fact that traditional standing rules require that a plaintiff suffer a
direct injury-in-fact in order to bring a claim, most modern circuit
courts have ruled that spousal challenges to public confidence laws are
too indirect to warrant independent standing.' 78 Consequently, these
courts have analyzed spousal challenges as mere derivatives of the
claims of the actual employee, holding that because the employee

174. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
175. Id.

176. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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could be constitutionally barred from certain activity, his or her
179
spouse could as well.
In direct opposition to the prevailing approach, the Eighth
Circuit recently held that a spouse challenging public confidence laws
has independent standing because such laws impose a direct injury on
the spouse.18 0 While this decision properly reflects the notion that
spouses of government employees should not be held to the same
standards as the actual employees, it is fundamentally flawed because
it merely utilizes the same approach as the courts before it to reach
the opposite result.18 1 If an opinion is to significantly alter the scope
of modern public confidence jurisprudence, that opinion must achieve
something more than mere disagreement with precedent. Instead, it
must force proponents of the prevailing English approach to recognize
the facial overbreadth exception as a legitimate procedural tool, and to
address the substantive requirement that First Amendment
restrictions be narrowly drawn.
The foundation of the alternate approach proposed by this Note
is currently available to courts. In fact, it has developed over time
through the cases leading up to the current circuit split. Seminal
Supreme Court public confidence cases, such as Broadrick and
Mitchell, consistently recognized that courts addressing certain First
Amendment claims were not bound to adhere strictly to traditional
injury-in-fact standing requirements.18 2 Instead, plaintiffs arguing
that their First Amendment rights are indirectly chilled by a
particular statute may challenge that statute on the grounds that it is
18 3
too broad on its face to comport with the Constitution.
Spousal challenges to public confidence laws appear to
represent precisely the types of claims that the Court envisioned when
it created this exception to traditional standing rules. 184 In short, they
are First Amendment claims that seek to prevent a broad statute from
attaining an unconstitutional scope.18 5 Nonetheless, the courts that
have addressed these spousal challenges have seemingly overlooked

179. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
180. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002).
181. Compare Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,283 F.3d at 975, with Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger,
189 F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1999), Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1279
(10th Cir. 1998), and English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir. 1979).
182. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); United Pub. Workers of Am. v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 112 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
183. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
184. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
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the facial overbreadth exception, choosing instead to strictly read
86
traditional standing doctrine to require a direct injury-in-fact.1
While the courts' failure to address the facial overbreadth issue
may be a product of poor pleadings that failed to adequately raise the
claim, poor pleadings alone should not dictate the terms of the debate
involving such a crucial First Amendment matter. Given that the
First Amendment is the "bulwark of our free political institutions,"
87
courts should not rely so strictly on the form of pleadings.
Nonetheless, even InternationalAssociation of Firefighters, the lone
case that did grant standing to spouses, failed to address the notion of
a facial overbreadth challenge. 8 8 Instead, it simply disagreed with
the prevailing jurisprudence of English, Horstkoetter and Biggs while
utilizing the same traditional standing analysis that those cases
employed. 8 9 That these courts were able to come to the opposite
conclusion using the same analysis demonstrates that the
InternationalAssociation of Firefighters opinion alone constitutes an
insufficient resolution to the circuit split.
Despite the weaknesses of the International Association of
Firefighters holding itself, the opinion could serve as a stepping stone
toward a solution to the current circuit split.190 By incorporating some
of the crucial principles from cases such as Broadrick and Mitchell
into the InternationalAssociation of Firefightersholding, the Supreme
Court could formulate a new public confidence jurisprudence that
protects the constitutional rights of the spouses of public employees.
First, adopting the concept from Broadrick that the facial
overbreadth exception is a legitimate procedural approach to First
Amendment claims would force courts to at least entertain facial
overbreadth challenges in this context. 191 Second, acknowledging
Justice Black's fear that public confidence statutes have become too
broad to meet a legitimate legislative goal would facilitate judicial
recognition that facial overbreadth challenges have substantive merit
as well as procedural merit. 192 Finally, applying the above principles
to the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the injury to spouses in this
context is indeed substantial would satisfy the Broadrick Court's
requirement that facial overbreadth challenges prove that the

186. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
187. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 110 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 180 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
191. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
192. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 112 (Black, J., dissenting).
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overbreadth was real and tangible. 193 In sum, the solution proposed
above should lead courts to find that public confidence laws are
facially overbroad and unconstitutional as applied to spouses of
government employees.
Nicholas R. Farrell

193. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969,
975 (8th Cir. 2002).

